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Revising Brain Death: 
Cultural Imperialism? 
by 
Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, BA, MA 
The author is a consultant ethicist in private practice and a 
philosopher. He specialized in health care ethics and served/or eight 
years at St. Vincent's Hospital, Melbourne, as Australia's first hospital 
ethicist. 
There is little doubt that acceptance of the practice of diagnosing death 
by the death of the whole brain criterion is collapsing. Both the ethical 
and medical literature contain numerous articles indicating an 
overwhelming flaw. 
Robert Veatch puts the case well. I He acknowledges that 
~. laboratory testing shows "nests of brain cells" may continue performing 
brain functions after clinical diagnosis of brain death. This would 
invalidate the application of the legal definition of death in terms of the 
irreversible cessation of all brain function. 
The legal definition of death, in jurisdictions that have formally 
adopted brain death, usually defines death as either irreversible 
cessation of the circulation of the blood or the irreversible cessation of 
all functions of the brain. In practice the latter depended on what came 
to be known as the Royal Colleges or Harvard Criteria. 
In 1968 a report entitled "A definition of Irreversible Coma", 
prepared by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to 
Examine the Definition of Death, was published.2 The Committee 
listed the following purely clinical criteria: unreceptivity and 
unresponsivity, no movements or breathing ( or absence of spontaneous 
breathing after turning the respirator off for three minutes), and no 
reflexes, and the non-clinical criterion of a flat electroencephalogram. 
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However, the Committee held that it was not necessary to do the latter. 
Though it recognized that an EEG offered confirmatory data, the 
Committee found that the abolition of function at cerebral, brain stem, 
and often spinal levels should be evident in all cases from clinical 
examination alone. However, they added that the neurological 
assessment gains in reliability if the aforementioned neurological signs 
persist over time and there is no accompanying hypothermia or 
evidence of drug intoxication.3 The clinical criteria specified became 
known as "the Harvard Criteria". 
The Canadian Medical Association published a similar 
"Statement on Death" in November, 19684, adding that in coma of 
unknown origin, all the tests be repeated twenty-four hours later. 
In 1976, the Conference of Medical Royal Colleges and their 
Faculties in the United Kingdom published a statement entitled 
"Diagnosis of Death".5 The Royal Colleges were a little more specific 
about excluding hypothermia, metabolic and endocrine disturbances, 
depressant drugs or relaxants. They also required certainty of 
irremediable structural brain damage and an established diagnosis of a 
disorder which can lead to brain death. The clinical criteria then listed 
are more or less the same as the Harvard Criteria, although the Colleges 
are more confident that an EEG is not necessary. They also held that 
other investigations such as cerebral angiography or cerebral blood flow 
measurements are not required for diagnosing brain death.6 
In 1979 the Royal Colleges added a memorandum entitled 
"Diagnosis of Death" in which they proclaimed that brain death 
represents that stage at which a patient becomes truly dead.7 Medical 
practice in English speaking countries since then has been to diagnose 
brain death by employing the Royal Colleges or Harvard criteria alone. 
In recent times, it has become more and more evident that 
meeting those clinical criteria alone often does not satisfy the 
commonly accepted legal definition of irreversible cessation of all 
function of the brain. Despite the recent evidence having grown to be 
overwhelming, with many studies now showing continued [unction of 
a variety of parts of the brain after diagnosis of brain deathS, that 
eventuality is held by some to be unimportant.9 Veatch argues that it 
is accepted in the same way that the President's Commission accepted 
that not all individual brain cells were necessarily dead. 1o To the 
contrary, however, there would seem to be a vast difference between a 
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few cells remaining alive, and sufficient sections of the brain remaining 
alive in such a way that some brain functions continue. 
Veatch claims that the legal definition of whole brain death does 
not in fact refer to the death of the whole brain any longer I I , and he is 
troubled by the fact that individual neurologists, philosophers, 
theologians, and public commentators seem to be determining just 
which brain functions are significant and which are not. There is a lack 
of consistency in clinical practice and a failure to refer the matter to the 
community and to elicit informed community opinion about the de 
facto adoption of new and variable standards for what constitutes death. 
According to Veatch, higher brain functions are the only significant 
functions, and he wishes to have the irreversible lack of higher brain 
functions adopted as the universal standard. 
Peter Singer argues similarly to the effect that the medical 
concept of brain death was more or less a fabrication, accepted to be so 
by the President's Commission 12, never supported by the medical facts 
and adopted pragmatically as an arbitrary cut off point. He would like 
to see it replaced by the criteria by which capacity for consciousness is 
the cut off point. 13 
Daniel Wikler attacks the notion of whole brain death itself, 
contending that the central argument, the integration thesis l4, which 
supports whole brain death, is incoherent and is likely to fall as soon as 
neurologists are able to diagnose persistent vegetative state (PVS) with 
certainty. IS 
John Catherwood goes one step further and argues that organ 
harvesting is permissible from the "irremediably dying" and hence that 
the discussion over the definition of death is irrelevant. 16 He would 
thus be satisfied with a prognosis rather than a diagnosis of death. 
Veatch suggests that applying a higher brain definition of death 
is consistent with a Judeo-Christian concept of mind-body integration: 
only when there is capacity for organic and mental function present 
together in a single living entity is there a living human being. He 
supports a higher brain definition with the possibility of conscientious 
objection in which those who wanted a more rigorous standard could 
object to organ donation. 17 There are some problems with Veatch's 
concept of mind-body interaction, and with using conscientious 
objection as a solution in the actual circumstances of organ 
transplantation. These are addressed later. 
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The above are radical solutions which involve a significant 
change in thinking about what constitutes death. There are seemingly 
two medical responses which would leave the legal status quo 18 intact 
and not challenge the apparent community acceptance of whole brain 
death as the appropriate definition, in these circumstances of the 
collapse of the Harvard and Royal Colleges criteria. 
The first is to follow the established French practice of requiring 
ancillary testing such as angiography, and that can now be 
supplemented by the range of newer diagnostic techniques in order to 
achieve greater certainty of the determination that complete cessation 
of all brain function has occurred. As described earlier, the Harvard 
and Royal Colleges criteria are clinical criteria only and do not require 
ancillary testing such as cerebral angiogram, Doppler ultrasound, and 
X-ray using contrast media to assess brain flow in the various parts of 
the brain and electroencephalograms. Laboratory assays establishing 
the presence of hormones originating from that part of the brain known 
as the hypothalamic-pituitary axis would also be significant. 19 
There does, however, seem to be resistance to this approach 
which may be partly a result both of a concern about limiting the 
availability of organs even further by excluding some donors who are 
now diagnosed as dead by the clinical criteria but would be shown to 
have some brain function if ancillary tests were done, and of the belief 
of many that some existing brain function in a person who will never 
regain consciousness is insignificant. The latter line is supported by 
Catherwood, Wilder, Veatch and Singer (above) amongst others, but it 
does involve a complete change in the accepted understanding either of 
death or of the legal status of those who suffer persistent coma. 
Whether such a change would be acceptable to the broader lay 
community is a matter that ought to be pursued. 
A major problem with adopting the looser determination, using 
death of the higher brain alone, is that cadaveric organ donation is not 
a one-to-one gift from donor or donor family to recipient which can be 
treated as a private matter subject only to the moral acceptance of those 
immediately engaged. First, the State has a responsibility to protect the 
right to life of members of the human family.20 Second, there are 
regional, state or national schemes or registers (and even international 
registers for some tissues) by which organs from a single donor are 
allocated to multiple recipients throughout a region. The recipients 
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need to have confidence that the organs are, in fact, taken from people 
who are really dead according to the recipients' own understanding of 
death. For this reason, Veatch's proposal for a combination of higher 
brain death and provision for conscientious objection is an inadequate 
solution. With the bureaucratically imposed secrecy about identifying 
the particular link between an organ donor and the recipients of his or 
her organs, the recipients must trust the general national standards for 
diagnosing death. These having collapsed, though not to any great 
extent yet publicly, the situation of informed conscientious potential 
recipients whose moral beliefs equate with the common legal standard 
of whole brain death, is unenviable. If one adopts the contemporary, 
legally accepted view that death has not occurred until there is 
irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain and knows the truth 
of the matter in regard to the practical collapse of its clinical application 
in recent times, then one is obliged to refuse organ donation and suffer 
the consequences. The proposition that one accept an organ taken from 
a person while still alive, in a process which brought about his or her 
death, would be acceptable to only the most amoral or morally 
indifferent, by ordinary standards21 , for organ procurement would be the 
cause of death, so death would have been caused in order to provide the 
organ. 
The reality of the circumstances of organ procurement and 
recipience is that a conscience clause could not function to permit 
individuals to choose their own definitions of death based on their 
religious and philosophical convictions as Veatch suggests it would.22 
A second medical alternative being pursued by some is the 
exploration of organ transplantation after cardio-respiratory death.23 
This has the practical problems of reducing the number of potential 
donors and hence organs, and the fact that steps have to be taken 
immediately after cardiac death to preserve the organs. Brain death is 
a relatively unstable state (generally not a state that lasts more than 
twenty-four hours when properly diagnosed24) but does allow greater 
time between diagnosis and harvesting organs. 
A quite different development happened in Denmark with the 
Danish Ethics Council's rejection of the brain death definition 
altogether and its insistence on irreversible. cessation of cardiac function 
as the end of the death process. The argument is based upon what the 
Council claimed was the "ordinary everyday definition of death". The 
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Council argues that relatives still relate to a brain dead person and that 
such a person should be treated as dying but not yet dead because of 
that relationship. However, they did accept that transplantation from 
the brain dead could occur (because they are in the process of dying) 
and the transplantation procedure would be taken as the. end of the 
death process. There seems to me to be some confused thinking in that 
conclusion. There seems to me to be a problem with accepting organ 
harvesting from a person judged to be still alive and, if the community 
consensus is that death has not occurred until cessation of cardiac 
activity, why would it accept "beating-heart" donation?2s 
The Danish Ethics Council's argument that death has not 
occurred until cessation of cardiac activity would seem to be valid, but 
it is sound only if the premise that the general community does not 
understand whole brain death to be death is true. It would indeed be 
quite wicked in practice to impose on the families of organ donors, and 
on transplant recipients, a concept of death determined by the brain 
death criteria, if their cultural belief was that life continued until 
circulation had irreversibly ceased. A religious or cultural judgement 
that life continues while blood circulation continues, even though there 
may be permanent loss of consciousness, need not be based upon a 
misunderstanding of the medical facts. In fact it may reflect belief in 
the sacredness of human beings in which the capacities which depend 
on consciousness constitute part of the reason for regarding human 
beings as sacred but that the reasons for holding each individual of 
human generation to be sacred may not be reduced to just 
consciousness or higher brain functions. The reductionism involved in 
seizing upon consciousness as a necessary feature for the many and 
complex aspects of the way in which we hold other human beings in 
high regard is by no means universally acceptable. 
In recent times greater attention is being given to the needs of 
bereaved families and that attention has significant advantages. There 
is a much greater likelihood of a family donating organs if attention is 
paid to their needs.26 The view of the Danish Ethics Council (in regard 
to brain death, though not its view about using the dying, but not dead, 
as organ donors), ought not be regarded as completely eccentric. There 
is a problem with the status quo, in regard to the way in which both the 
families of donors and the transplant recipients are treated, if the actual 
clinical determination of death would not in fact meet the general 
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community standards and match its understanding of death. 
As an ethicist I have frequently encountered circumstances in 
which families of donors, who in the aftermath (sometimes very much 
later) of having agreed to donation, doubt whether their relative was in 
fact dead at the time. Grief can be vastly complicated in such 
circumstances by the notion that one has betrayed one's relative. 
A source of difficulty is that in the urgency and the shock of 
dealing in rapid succession with: 
• massive brain trauma to a relative 
• the extraordinary context of the intensive care unit 
• having brain death explained (usually for the first time) 
• being asked for consent to donation, and 
• then having to leave (abandon) the dead (dying) relative at a 
time when he or she still has all the appearances of continued 
life especially respiration (albeit machine assisted), a beating 
heart and muscle reflexes. 
the family is forced to place great trust in the health professionals for 
whom none of this is new or shocking, but routine, and who have the 
confidence of being in much greater possession of information. 
Later, when the family re-examines, in a more leisurely fashion, 
what happened, they do not have to place such trust in what they were 
told, and they often question the details they were told (or do not 
adequately remember) and the validity of what they were told. At that 
time, their cultural or religious resistance to the concept of brain death, 
or to accepting the certainty of the medical diagnosis, may assert itself 
and compound their grieving. The latter is particularly the case 
because, when death is diagnosed by the Harvard or Royal Colleges 
criteria alone, there is no evidence to present to the relatives that death 
has, in fact, occurred. The clinical tests do not confirm death to a 
layperson. Ancillary testing could provide the means to remedy that 
with ultra-sound or X-ray pictures showing complete loss of circulation 
to the brain and the extent of the brain destruction. When members of 
the family later investigate and fmd out, for instance, sometimes for the 
first time, that organs are taken while the heart still beats, or that the 
practice is to administer a general anesthetic to donors for the 
harvesting operation (which the relatives often interpret as implying the 
need to suppress capacity to feel pain indicating continued brain 
function), they may be extremely distressed and feel exploited. 
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In many accounts of their experiences given to me by donor 
families, even by those who do not regret donation, the matter of being 
confronted by the concept and reality of death by brain death, and being 
asked for consent to donation, was later seen as part of the original 
trawna. In a sense, they may feel assailed or assaulted, not just by the 
devastating events that led to the relative suffering the brain injury, but 
also by the additional events which occurred for the sake of organ 
transplantation. 
On the other side of the ledger, as a hemodialysis patient I have 
often sat with other patients27 to whom the alternative of a cadaveric 
kidney transplant was being put most forcefully, on both economic and 
personal health grounds, and seen the patients' disquiet at the prospect, 
and their unanswered questions about anything to do with the source of 
the organs. The bureaucratic separation between donatidn and 
procurement on the one hand, and transplant and recipience on the 
other, is complete both practically and conceptually. The notion of 
giving and receiving has largely been replaced, through the large scale 
and bureaucratic nature of the process, by taking and gettini8, and this 
is hwnanly most unfortunate. Further, there seems to be a complete 
absence of understanding, for instance, that recipients for their own 
sake often need to know something of the nature of organ procurement 
and to have confidence in and, hence, knowledge of the circwnstances 
of brain death and its diagnosis. The tendency seems to be to steer 
them away from such questions and to play down the nature of the 
source of the organs. One ought to be circwnspect about matters that 
the health professions consider important to surround in secrecy, even 
though the latter may be for the best of motives. 
The opinion that we ought to be moving toward detennining 
death according to whether the patient has pennanently lost 
consciousness is one which I do not believe would have the broad 
acceptance necessary for adoption within our current structures of 
regional registers. Further, as I have indicated, this is the perspective 
that needs to be adopted. It is not a matter which can be addressed by 
simply providing for conscientious objection. The standard by which 
death is judged to have occurred needs to be narrow enough to be 
broadly, even if not universally, accepted. 
On that basis it need only to be shown that a significant 
spectrum of belief in the community would not accept the change in 
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order to defeat the proposal that Veatch, Singer, Catherwood, Wikler, 
Raanon Gillon, and others have argued - the proposal that permanent 
lost consciousness or higher brain function be all that is required. 
Raanon Gillon editorializes29 on the Danish Council of Ethics 
decision in a way which highlights a problem of arrogance and cultural 
intolerance amongst the advocates of the higher brain criterion: 
... For whatever one's concept of a person is, one feature widely 
acknowledged as necessary for a person is a capacity - or at least 
the potential for a capacity - for consciousness. It follows that 
when a person has permanently lost the capacity for consciousness 
- as occurs in brain death - the person no longer exists, the person 
is dead. 
Even if "widely acknowledged", which I doubt that it is, outside of the 
narrow circles of this elitist discussion, it is not anything like a general 
or a universal acceptance. The proposal for conscientious objection, 
based on differing understandings of death, would be likely to create 
uncertainty about brain death and mistrust. There needs to be a 
standard which is tight enough to be generally acceptable. A double or 
variable standard would vastly complicate community understanding 
and the application of the law. More than that it would foster 
uncertainty and undermine confidence in the care of those who are 
severely brain damaged and their protection under the law. 
Veatch states something similar (to Gillon's position): 
No one really believes that literally all functions of the entire brain 
must be lost for an individual to be dead. A better defmition of 
death involves a higher brain orientation.30 
There would seem to me to be a significant body of opinion to the 
contrary. I am not alone in believing that functions of the brain (not 
just activity in individual cells or clusters of cells) are significant, 
particularly if they are functions that integrate systemic and organic 
functions of the rest of the body. 31 
The problem arises, I suspect, from both reductionism and a 
category mistake. 
It has always been a category mistake to refer to "brain death" 
as a definition of death, and doing so encourages a failure to actually 
define death. It makes sense to say that one may diagnose death by 
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criteria which establish death of the whole brain, but that leaves open 
the question as to what it is that death is. What is it that death of the 
whole brain is being used to diagnose? 
Gillon is suggesting that death is permanently lost 
consciousness, and brain death the criteria by which it can be 
recognized. The mistake with that, it seems to me, is that we know that 
a person is much more than merely consciousness, and that when the 
entity that we have held to be a person no longer has the capacity for 
that one feature but retains many others and continues as a living entity, 
it is not altogether clear what or who it is that continues to live, and 
whether it is proper to describe as death what is in fact only partial 
death even though death of such a significant feature as the capacity for 
consciousness. 
The substantial issue in defining death is not the question of 
how it might be diagnosed. Rather it is to define what the concept 
means. It is only then that one can turn to examining the criteria by 
which it might be diagnosed. 
It seems trite to say, as a dictionary may, that death is the final 
cessation of vital functions of an organism or the end of life.32 But that 
would seem to be a reasonable starting point prompting the questions: 
what is life? and what are vitalfunctions? What is it that is essentially 
or necessarily ended for death to have occurred? 
In this respect Peter Singer points to the anomaly that "brain 
death" is only for humans, and the oddity that for a human being to die 
now requires a different concept of death from that which we apply to 
other living beings.33 
There does seem to be a significant difference between a body 
that is stiff, cold, and rotting, and a body which has permanently lost 
consciousness but retains all other living functions, except those 
dependant on consciousness. The latter is at least as alive as a healthy 
tree or vegetable. Though many wish to say that a person in such a 
state is dead, for many others, as a member of our community he or she 
continues to share in the solidarity of that community, passively, but 
still a living relative and the subject of attention and love, love perhaps 
reciprocated for love once received. 
It seems that redefining death, in the way in which it came to be 
applied in clinical practice, did not involve actually redefining death. 
Rather it involved declaring that a living human being who was so 
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damaged as to lose the capacity for consciousness could be treated as 
though they were dead, and that pennanent loss of consciousness could 
be said to have occurred when the specified clinical criteria were met. 
(It seems that, to those who were in the know so to speak, brain death 
meant pennanentiy lost consciousness and was accepted as death even 
though publicly the definition was narrower. The legal definition that 
death had occurred when there was irreversible loss of all function of 
the brain was misleading as it was often not applied in clinical 
practice.) The idea that death had been re-defined is, and always was, 
something of a category mistake. The life is not ended in a person who 
has pennanently lost consciousness but functions otherwise. To say 
that they are dead is simply a falsehood. 
This category mistake was particularly misleading because it 
was generally believed by those who sought to be infonned in the 
community that the legal declaration was being applied, which it never 
was. Until relatively recently (1992), as an ethicist, I was myself 
misled in this respect, having had brain death explained to me and seen 
it explained to donor families many times as the brain event equivalent 
of having been guillotined. Having now studied the medical literature, 
I know that to be false, and more than that, it was known to be false as 
early as 1977 following the multi-center study funded by the National 
Institutes of Neurological Disease and Stroke.34 The legal definition of 
death in tenns of loss of all function of the brain was far more 
acceptable than the actual clinical practice, because it does actually 
correspond to a state which would be recognizable as death in any 
living species. There would not be a problem if there were strict 
medical compliance with the current law common to most Western 
jurisdictions. 
The law which defines death of all function of the brain as death 
is acceptable because some function of the brain is essential for keeping 
the body together as a unit which has integrated functions . Properly 
speaking a human body no longer exists as a single living body when 
it has no brain because its organs no longer have integrated functions. 
It is a fact that in humans the integrated functioning of the organs 
occurs through systems that are exclusively controlled by the functions 
of the brain, for integration occurs through the endocrine and neural 
systems and they are controlled from within the brain. If the brain 
(including the brain stem) is removed or totally destroyed the integrated 
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connectedness of the organs no longer occurs. 
If I break a tree into pieces, I may, by planting the pieces, the 
cuttings, have a continuity of life, although the individual tree itself is 
no longer alive. A wood heap is not a tree, even though for some time 
life is retained and may regenerate in planted cuttings. A bag of loose 
organs no longer functioning in an integrated fashion but each retaining 
its o ... vn separate life, as it were, is not a living body, it is not one 
discrete entity but many. A human body with no brain is as dead as a 
tree is dead when it has been cut up into a heap of cuttings and logs of 
wood. Life continues only in the distinct parts, not as life of a whole. 
On these grounds, the legal declaration of brain death in terms 
of death of all function of the brain was broadly acceptable as death. 
No really significant change in the general concept of death was being 
asked of us. We could understand keeping the organs of a guillotined 
body alive by machines although the body as a body had been 
disintegrated (by the severing of the dynamic connection betw~en the 
organs through the loss of a functioning brain), and hence was dead. 
But that, we now know, was in practice a very misleading description 
as, in fact, some brain functions often continued, and were known to do 
so. 
We may well want to argue, as Peter Singer does,35 that it is the 
capacity for consciousness and higher brain functions that are crucial. 
That is to say, those capacities are crucial for the way in which we treat 
people. However we ought not falsify death declarations. We may 
advocate using the irretrievably dying and the persistently comatose as 
though they were dead, but it is utterly false to claim that they are dead. 
There is a similarity here to the abortion debate. One may argue as 
Judith Jarvis Thomson has done36 that abortion is legitimate as a 
woman's right to do with her own body as she chooses, without also 
claiming that the developing child in the womb is not a human being. 
It is not accurate to argue for abortion on the grounds that a human 
being is not destroyed by it. Similarly it is not accurate to treat of the 
matter of the care of people who are permanently unconscious, (I find 
the term permanent vegetative state, PVS, utterly dehumanizing and 
insensitive), or their mooted use as a source of organs for transplant, 
on the assumption that they are not alive. 
The further point to be made is that the treatment of integration 
by Veatch37 essentially expresses a dualism that is not broadly 
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acceptable within the Judeo-Christian tradition. It is certainly not 
acceptable within the Catholic Tradition, for the latter rejects dualism. 
The Tradition considers the human being to be a profound unity of soul 
and body in which the soul is the "form" of the body: 
.. .it is because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter 
becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in man, are not 
two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature. 38 
Raanon Gillon39 refers to a unity of consciousness and body in 
commenting on the Danish Ethics Council rejection of dualism, but this 
unity is not a unity which is recognized by the Catholic Tradition at 
least, if not by other less formalized Christian traditions. The 
distinction between mind and body is not a dichotomy that the 
Tradition recognizes. It is not part of the Catholic Tradition to make a 
distinction between mind and body or consciousness and body. Rather, 
the Tradition holds to a unity of soul and body and so defines them as 
to make it impossible for there to be a living body without a soul. A 
body without a soul would not be animatecf°, that is to say it would not 
have a life principle, it would not be formed by a soul. There is nothing 
in the Tradition that would suggest that the capacity for consciousness 
is essential for the human being to be treated with the respect owed to 
a human being, made in the image and likeness of God. To the 
contrary, the Second Vatican Council held: 
Man, though made of body and soul, is a unity. Through his very 
bodily condition he sums up in himself the elements of the material 
world. Through him they are thus brought to their highest 
perfection and can raise their voice in praise freely given to the 
Creator. For this reason man may not despise his bodily life. 
Rather he is obliged to regard his body as good and to hold it in 
honour since God has created it and will raise it up on the last 
day.41 
It is also false to claim, as Peter Singer does with some cynicism, that 
the whole brain criterion was accepted by leading Catholic 
commentators because they saw it as a way of heading off the pressure 
for euthanasia.42 That would imply that the acceptance of the concept 
of recognizing death of the whole brain as indicative of death was not 
itself the reason for their acquiescence to the Harvard Committee 
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proposal. In fact, two of those to whom he refers, Germain Grisez and 
Joseph Boyle, adopted first a definition of death which they thought 
properly characterized what death of an organism is, which they 
described as "the permanent termination of the integrated functioning 
characteristic of a living body as a whole" and, on the basis of the 
empirical evidence, judged that, in humans, that had occurred when 
"there is complete and irreversible loss of the functioning of the entire 
brain.43 
Singer also misrepresents Pope Pius XII by selectively quoting 
him in the following way: 
and 
In replying, Pius XII had reiterated the Church's concept of death 
as the complete and final separation of the soul from the body, but 
he also said, "It remains for the doctor, and especially the 
anaesthesiologist, to give a clear and precise defmition of 'death' 
and the 'moment of death' of a patient who passes away in a state of 
unconsciousness. " 
This statement must have made it very difficult for those within the 
Roman Catholic Church to mount any opposition to the Harvard 
Committee's proposal.44 
Singer's account mischievously selects from a general 
discussion of the issue that the Pope indulged in before seeking to 
address three separate questions, which he chose to answer directly 
under the headings: A doctor's rights and duties (in regard tQ 
maintaining artificial respiration and who can make the decisions), 
Extreme unction (whether the sacrament now known as the Sacrament 
of the Sick can be administered), and When is one dead? It is the 
answer to the latter which is relevant to this discussion. Singer's 
analysis is not consistent with the following passage from the Pope's 
direct answer under the heading When is one dead?: 
64 
Where the verification of the fact in particular cases is concerned, 
the answer cannot be deduced from- any religious and moral 
principle and, under this aspect, does not fall within the 
competence of the Church. Until an answer can be given the 
question must remain open. But considerations of a general nature 
allow us to believe that human life continues for as long as its vital 
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functions - distinguished from the simple life of organs - manifest 
themselves spontaneously or even with the help of artificial 
processes. A great number of these cases are the object of 
insoluble doubt, and must be dealt with according to the 
presumptions of law and of fact of which We have spoken.4S 
Earlier in the text he states: 
In case of insoluble doubt, one can resort to presumptions of law 
and of fact. In general, it will be necessary to presume that life 
remains, because there is involved here a fundamental right 
received from the Creator, and it is necessary to prove with 
certainty that it has been lost. 46 
Singer's claim that the Pope's response would have made it 
difficult to mount opposition to the Harvard Committee's proposal is at 
least obscure, if not simply mistaken. The fact that some vital functions 
may continue in those who meet the Harvard criteria, including assisted 
breathing, spontaneous cardiac function and some integrating brain 
functions, would seem to require, in the terms that the Pope uses, that 
the presumption of doubt must in general be given. 
In passing, given that Singer chose to bring Popes into the 
discussion, it is worth noting that the present Pope, John Paul II, 
referred to this matter by way of expressing the following caution: 
Nor can we remain silent in the face of other more furtive, but no 
less real, forms of euthanasia. These could occur for example 
when, in order to increase the availability of organs for transplants, 
organs are removed without respecting objective and adequate 
criteria which verify the death of the donor.47 
Belief in the dynamic unity of soul and body is held by a 
significant group within society including those who belong to the 
Catholic Tradition. But for them, the proposal for redefining death in 
terms of the capacity for consciousness is not acceptable and the change 
would, in effect, make the regional registers for organ transplantation, 
in principle, unavailable to them as recipients and create anxiety and 
mistrust when families are asked to donate. It would also create yet 
another difficult area of conscientious objection for health 
professionals. 
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One would hope that, in a pluralist society, a more broadly 
acceptable definition of death would be used. A definition in which 
death is understood as the complete and permanent loss of the 
integration of the body, which empirically may be established as having 
occurred when all function of the brain permanently ceases (the 
definition recognized in the law of most Western countries), would 
seem to be more broadly acceptable, even if narrower than some of the 
contemporary protagonists would prefer. The problem is to ensure that 
the criteria used comply with the culturally accepted notion of death, 
and to insist upon more reliable determination than is currently 
provided by the Harvard and Royal Colleges guidelines which only 
require a clinical determination. Better technologies are available. 
The deception of the community, in which a practice that fails 
to fulfil the explicit legal requirements has been adopted by many in the 
profession, is likely to be most injurious to the image and reputation of 
intensive care and transplant practice, once it is generally exposed to 
public scrutiny. 
The mooted option of validating that deception by pragmatically 
adopting the notion that anyone who permanently loses consciousness 
is therefore dead vandalizes the language and reflects a cultural 
imperialism that ought not be tolerated. It would seem both just and 
pragmatic to properly adhere to the current law which requires 
irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain. 
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